The onset of psychotic disorders often brings major changes to an individual, which, for some, are never fully reversed and remain a dominant force. Despite such changes, the individual still experiences themselves as a continuous person and must find some way to assimilate these shifts into their self-concept. From a philosophical perspective, the various models of continuing identity all depend upon some notion of fundamental stability, which seems a poor fit for the trajectory associated with psychotic disorders. This article will explore, in more depth, how the transitions that accompany psychotic disorders present a challenge to conventional and philosophical notions of selfhood. If we are not simply to judge psychotic disorders as bringing about a loss of selfhood, we will need an alternative model of identity to use in this context.
| INTRODUCTION: PSYCHOTIC DISORDERS AND LOSS OF IDENTITY?
Ironically, the loss and disorder of person so characteristic of our conceptions of schizophrenia may be at least partly our own invention, and one of many ways in which we desert the person who has schizophrenia. We may both compound and create the isolation of inner and social self by failing to investigate and acknowledge the persistence of person. 1 
| Challenging the model of psychosis as "loss of self"
Psychotic disorders are often seen as an alien influence, which separates the individual from their prepsychosis self and may bring about the temporary or even permanent destruction of that self and, with this, a loss of legitimate identity. For some, though, this new identity is not just a fleeting aberration, but a permanent state of being, while others, even if their psychotic symptoms remit temporarily or permanently, cannot or do not want to accept that everything about themselves, which has come with the advent of psychotic disorder, is, in some way, illegitimate and makes no meaningful contribution to their life. Chadwick, for example, writes about the "spiritual sensitivities" awakened during a psychotic episode:
It is wrong to scorn this aspect of the psychotic and prepsychotic state as some do. Being able to reinvigorate the feeling of being open to forces as if from beyond oneself, provided one can retain some measure of organizing control and discernment, is immensely enriching of creative and emotional life. 2 In these cases, it seems that a view of the legitimate self as lost is insufficient and risks both breaching how the individual understands themselves and consigning them to loss of meaningful or legitimate identity. 3 For other individuals with psychosis, to conceive of the self as distinct from and struggling against the illness, in an attempt at self-recovery and preservation, comes to represent a way of managing the condition. Nevertheless, even for those who do posit a self/illness separation, it was still they themselves who experienced the psychotic state and must somehow integrate these experiences into their self-concept, no matter how distinct this state might be from their non-psychotic self. Even if they or others label such experiences as the products of an episode of "psychotic disorder," these experiences themselves and the reactions they provoked had some validity that cannot simply be erased through this subsequent judgement. Moreover, their understanding of the illness rests on a notion of an identity that persists throughout episodes and illness-related shifts.
By contrast, we are perhaps overly conditioned to think of selfhood in terms of continuity, coherence, and sameness as its central concepts, whether this continuity resides in internal psychological connectedness, overall coherence, or our relations to others around us, and such a view is also reflected in dominant philosophical models of personal identity. It seems, therefore, that we might need an alternative model, which can accommodate these shifts and provides some way to allow that the person with a psychotic disorder is still themselves, even if radically different from their prepsychosis self. In his recent "first person account" in Schizophrenia Bulletin, quoted at the start of this paper, Jason Jepson talks, very movingly, about the night he arrived at "self-acceptance":
The bad experiences and rough times came back in flashbacks. I didn't regret anything. They had made me who I am. I am enlightened…. This was not the end, but only the start of becoming an individual that can stand and say, "I Am and will always be ME." 4 For Jepson, self-acceptance comes with the insight that, no matter what changes schizophrenia has brought, his identity is one constant:
"I Am and will always be ME."
The experience of one's self as one's self is integral to human nature, however changed one's beliefs, experiences, and behaviours might be-no matter what transitions might occur, a sense of selfhood is maintained. Part of managing psychotic disorders, finding a way for the individuals and for others to come to terms with the changes and reducing the associated stigma and negative stereotypes may lie in finding ways to accommodate a self, which is both unrecognisably altered and yet, in some way, persists. In the words of Jefferson:
Something has happened to me-I do not know what. All that was my former self has crumbled and fallen together and a creature has emerged of whom I know nothing. She is a stranger to me. … She is not real-she is not I … she is I-and because I still have myself on my hands, even if I am a maniac, I must deal with me somehow.
1
Once again, what we see, even while symptoms are still present, is the conjunction of a strong sense of continuing identity, "she is I-and because I still have myself on my hands," with a strong sense of radical change and discontinuity. Moreover, for Jefferson, managing her condition means finding a way to accommodate this conjunction, however incompatible its components might seem.
Glover quotes Champ's account of his own schizophrenia: "you do not simply patch up the self you were before developing schizophrenia … you have to actually recreate a concept of who you are that integrates the experience of schizophrenia." As Glover comments, "although the new created self is not just a reproduction of the original self, there is a kind of continuity with it." 3 . Clearly, this "kind of continuity" does not preclude fundamental shifts and discontinuities between the prepsychosis and postpsychosis self. If we are to do justice to the experience of psychosis and the sense of identity experienced by those with psychotic disorders, it seems that we need a model of identity, which acknowledges a normative connection between persistence and legitimacy in this context and which can, accordingly, accommodate dramatic change alongside some sense of persistence.
Despite the centrality of identity shifts to schizophrenia, the effect that psychosis has on selfhood, and how this can be integrated into an understanding of the condition, is little explored. 1, 3 Moreover, not only does this represent a gap in the study of psychotic disorders; at the same time, the consideration of identity within psychotic disorders itself raises several questions for both our ordinary conceptions of selfhood and identity and for existing philosophical models of personal identity, neither of which appear able to accommodate a model of identity that would adequately reflect the experience of selfhood within psychotic disorders.
The following is the development of a session exploring the issue of identity within psychotic disorders, presented at the workshop on "Mental disorder and self over time" at King's College London in August 2015. Using vignettes from this session, we consider how current theories of personal identity provide an inadequate framework within which to explicate and examine the shifts in identity typical of psychotic disorders, including schizophrenia, and how we might reconceptualize identity to provide a more fitting model. In the spirit of the workshop, our aim is that this paper should be interesting and accessible to both philosophers and clinicians.
1.2 | Psychotic disorders-Why might they be understood as a loss of self?
While it may argued that the experience of psychotic disorders involves some sense of a persistent and legitimate identity, it is, nevertheless, the case that perhaps the simplest way to answer the question of what happens to a person's continuing self-identity within psychotic disorders is to suggest that, on some level, it is fundamentally damaged or lost. At one point, Jefferson describes her prepsychosis self as a "ghost," now overpowered by a new and stronger "creature." 5 The new self is seen as too different from the prepsychosis self to be viewed as legitimate, both in the sense that it is too distinct and separate from how others perceive and relate to the world and, also, that it is too distinct from the individual as others knew them before the onset of psychosis to be considered authentic. Accordingly, a major aim of treatment or recovery is viewed as the restoration of this former self. Alistair Campbell, writing recently about his brother's struggle with schizophrenia, describes how treatment, such as medication, "can often help restore someone to the person they are supposed to be, unclouded by the illness." 6 In an influential article on the phenomenology of schizophrenia, Sass and Parnas describe schizophrenia as a "self-disorder" and say that the diverse symptoms of this condition are unified through "their rootedness in certain disturbances of selfhood or self-experience." 7 Stanghellini and Ballerini say that for those with schizophrenia, "being in the world involves fragility of the tacit dimension of self-coherence that is at the base both of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, a pervasive experience of self as absent or missing to the subject." 8 Similarly, Fabrega talks about an "impairment of self-functioning involving self-awareness, definition, and regulation" and says, in terms of the self, schizophrenia can be said to alter and disturb an individual's customary sense of self; sense of boundaries between self and others (of the behavioural environment), and the ability of the self to relate meaningfully to the cultural world. Change appears to be seen as a linear process of one-way transitions, and there is an assumption that connectedness between individual points decreases with temporal distance:
Between me now and myself at future times, there will be the various connections of memory, intention, character, desire, taste, ambition, and the like. Over different periods, these connections differ in both strength and number. They will generally be fewer and weaker over longer periods' . means that mere physical continuity would not "justify egoistic con- Of course, it could be argued that science-fiction-based philosophical examples have little connection to real examples of illness and its effect on an individual. Nevertheless, the elements of a person, which Parfit lists as critically important, are a very real part of how we think of selfhood and, both for the individual with psychosis themselves and for those around them, given the sudden and major shifts in such elements, it is clear that such views would be problematic.
Effectively, even if we recognize the "new" or "changed" person as a legitimate person, if the degree of sudden change is sufficient, it would, according to reductionist ideas, not be meaningful to suggest that there is some element of continuing identity or that either of these two separate selves is of any concern to the other. Moreover, given that the "old" person has now ceased to exist, would this then mean that a post-episode individual, even if they retain many of the elements of their pre-episode self, must be seen as yet another person, rather than a return to a person whose identity has been temporarily affected?
A core aim of the reductionist thesis is to free us from concerns about our identity and fears about remote events, by showing us that, even if it were possible that some "further fact" of personal identity did exist, this is "not what matters" 11 and make us realize that, if sufficient psychological connectedness is no longer there, we do not have to worry about this person anymore. However, it is hard to see how this would either reflect the experience or ease the concerns of someone for whom an episodic psychotic disorder means that their life will now include sudden major transitions in key elements of psychological connectedness, combined with a sense that it is fundamentally important that their identity is, to themselves, persisting throughout these changes.* Another model of identity, which has roots in psychology, is the theory of narrative identity. This is the notion that the self is constituted by the "internalized and evolving story of the self that a person constructs to make sense and meaning out of his or her life." 12 As
Schechtman says, of the most basic narrativist view: "our actions must be meaningful and significant in a way that cannot be captured in purely naturalistic terms, but requires that we interpret our behaviours in the context of a narrative." 13 Johnston et al give a "non-technical"
definition of "narrative" as "an instantiation of the beliefs, values, experiences, actions, decisions, events and relationships that give meaning and coherence to a person's life." 14 For many accounts of narrative identity, it is overall coherence which is the foundation of stable identity and, as some argue, the basis of psychological well-being. 15 With *Parfit does suggest that we can remain committed to the 'same person', if there are temporary periods when they 'are not of a sound mind'. However, this simplistic view of mental disorder suggests that a legitimate sense of identity is somehow dormant within periods of mental disorder' and is not consistent with the notion that identity persists in some ways through episodes, that elements of psychosis may well persist or that experiences from these episodes are viewed as valid experiences, to be incorporated in some way into the person's self-concept.
or without the normative claim, selfhood resides in some fundamental narrative unity or integrity stretching across my life, as understood from a later vantage point. Dennett, for example "conceives of a selfnarrative as trying to unify an entire life-making 'all of our material cohere into a single good story.'" 13 . Even for those narrative theorists, such as Schechtman, who do not insist on an overall unity to the narrative, the self is still a narrative entity, constituted by the continuity of its background narrative and "ongoing story."
Finally, we might consider identity from the viewpoint of a sociological or anthropologically based relational or social model of selfhood, which views an individual's identity as dependent, in some fundamental way, on the role they play within their culture and society and how they are known by the others around them: "Belonging in a normative way to a larger group or groups both conveys and constitutes a sense of self, provides an identity in relation to others and by virtue of others' acknowledgment of us." 1 Grounded in social constructionist theories, our identity is viewed as a relatively stable and coherent entity, constructed through our role within our relationships with those around us. Within the diverse background and variations amongst these social models, the common feature that emerges is the centrality of our social role to the concepts that both the individual themselves and others have of their identity. 16, 17 Despite the differences between these 3 reductionist, narrative and social models of identity, what they share is the sense that the most important aspects of identity reside in some degree of consistency and coherence, which gives shape to our lives and defines who we are. If we consider selfhood or identity from the viewpoint of dominant models, it may well seem that the advent of psychotic disorders brings with it, on some level, the eradication of self and that these models appear, therefore, to support the notion that such transitions constitute some major loss of identity. It seems that, if we are to find a model that can support some notion of continuing identity that persists throughout such transitions, we will need to challenge such concepts.
Given that our models of what constitute identity appear unable to accommodate this version of selfhood, it seems that we must look outside of these notions.
| WHAT CHANGES COME WITH PSYCHOTIC DISORDERS?
Before proceeding to a more detailed examination of how such notions of selfhood fail to accommodate the challenges that arise in relation to psychotic disorders, and how such challenges might be met, we will examine, in more depth, what constitute the typical patterns and components of these changes. Psychotic disorders are typified by a fracturing from the past self, which happens relatively suddenly and inexplicably and, from which, sometimes, there is no return to the previous predisorder self: as Jefferson says, the predisorder self becomes a "ghost." Along with many examples taken from academic and nonacademic writings on psychotic disorders, to give a fuller picture of how such changes occur and the key elements of these changes, we will also draw upon 3 brief clinical vignettes. These are based on clinical encounters and illustrate some central and common dilemmas encountered when working with those suffering from psychotic disorders. They have been carefully anonymized and are, by no means, representative of all patients suffering from psychosis.
| Clinical vignettes
Amelia was the youngest of 5 siblings, born in London to secondgeneration Afro-Caribbean parents, with whom she still lived. After doing well at school, she went on to study music at college and was described by family and friends as a reserved person who derived great pleasure from playing guitar and singing with friends from church. She first became ill in her mid-20s, claiming, unexpectedly, that she was Mary, the mother of Jesus, and that God was speaking directly to her and guiding all of her actions. At the same time, she now maintained that her basic physical needs were unimportant, compared with her need to spread the word of God. After a couple of weeks of inpatient treatment, Amelia was able once again to accept being called Amelia and to talk about resuming aspects of her life such as music and work. Nevertheless, those involved with her care believed that she was still harbouring the same delusional beliefs, but that the intensity of these beliefs had decreased, and that she was simply choosing not to talk about them.
During this episode, Amelia had believed, wholeheartedly, that she was then and had always been Mary, the mother of Jesus, and was unprepared to recognize any other self. For Amelia, it seems, sufficient connectedness persisted with her pre-episode self to allow her to identify with and return to her past roles and relationships.
Yet, at the same time, a belief that she was fundamentally different remained, though fluctuating in intensity.
Janice was born and bred in South London. The second of 3 daughters, whose parents were teachers in a local school; she had completed a college degree in Media Studies and had worked in local shops and restaurants until becoming a full-time single carer for her 2 children. She started to experience incessant and intense vocal auditory hallucinations and became convinced that the "voice messages" were being sent to her by an international atomic agency, the same agency that was also "scanning" her thoughts. The perceived actions of this agency became an obsession, which consumed her life entirely for a couple of years; she spent more and more time researching this atomic energy agency and trying to convince others of the veracity of her beliefs. She was admitted to hospital after being arrested outside a building she believed to be the agency's headquarters, where she was demanding to speak directly to the agency's CEO. While in hospital, shocked by the temporary loss of contact with her children, for whom she had been caring all along, Janice made a huge effort to appear less preoccupied with the agency and to pay more attention to the practical aspects of her life. She was successful in her efforts and, after being discharged from hospital, she only spoke about her beliefs to her clinicians, and only when asked. In one of these sessions, she admitted that the worst that could happen to her was to find out that she had been wrong all along and that she had never been the victim of the international agency's plot. Janice's compromise solution seems to have been not to choose one identity over another, but to keep them simultaneously active and construct a self-concept incorporating them both.
Johann, the bright child of first generation immigrants to the United Kingdom, and the first in his family to go to university, had always been shy and polite and with few friends. In his final year at university, he became more reclusive, and by the time he moved back home after graduation, he remained in his room nearly all the time, with minimal communication, sleeping during the day and playing videogames or surfing the web during the night. After a few months, his behaviour suddenly changed. Suspicious and argumentative, he accused his parents of being impostors and claimed that they were tampering with his computer and poisoning his food. After a brief admission to hospital, Johann was no longer preoccupied with unusual thoughts but then appeared not to be preoccupied with anything else.
During the 2 subsequent years, Johann seemed to have lost all interest in anybody or anything, while still remaining the same shy and polite person as before. When his community nurse brings him to appointments in the clinic, he is largely indifferent, gently answering the clinicians' questions simply with "yes," "no," or grinning silently, as if closed to the world around him. To Johann, and to those of his friends and relatives who saw him sporadically, he was the same as he had always been; but his close relatives and clinicians were exasperated with his new and seemingly irreversible "locked in" self.
| The pattern of change
In these cases, as is typical, the initial onset of illness brings a major transition in identity and changes beliefs concerning, for example, who you are; who others are; your role and priorities; your relationship with the people and world around you: "having schizophrenia … results in a transformation of self as known inwardly, and of person or identity as known outwardly by others." 1 Sass and Parnas describe the "diminished self-affection," which can lead the individual with schizophrenia to the belief that they are under the control of some alien force. 7 Amelia suddenly believes that she is Mary and under God's spell; Janice's life becomes entirely dominated by the atomic energy agency's monitoring, with prior duties and responsibilities neglected;
Johann's obsession with the plot against him leads him to neglect all prior interests, question the legitimacy of and even threaten his own family, and, finally, lose all interest in the world around him. Leete writes, "more than by any other one thing, my life has been changed by schizophrenia," 18 and, in the words of Fabrega: reformulated in terms of the self, schizophrenia can be said to alter and disturb an individual's customary sense of self; sense of boundaries between self and others … and the ability of the self to relate meaningfully to the cultural world. Although the individual may, themselves, feel secure in their new identity, they are, in relation to others and the role they have held up to that point, unrecognisable.
In general, such changes are untenable. While Mary neglected to eat and drink, Johann and Janice's behaviour became threatening. In the book Henry's Demons, a first-hand account of schizophrenia written by both Henry himself and his father, Henry was hospitalized after a life-threatening attempt to swim across the Newhaven estuary, fully clothed, in Winter. 19 Often, as with Johann, the so-called negative symptoms of schizophrenia overwhelm the individual, as they retreat into themselves and lose all interest, motivation, and involvement in the world around them. Sass and Parnas discuss the "hyperreflexivity (increased selfawareness)," which means that "effort must be exerted to achieve forms of bodily and cognitive integration that would normally occur automatically." 7 She said to me, "He won't do it because he feels he is defending his whole identity and integrity, and taking the drugs means that everything he thinks is wrong." I remembered that to Henry, his voices and visions were quite real, and what he heard and saw was often quite beautiful and revelatory.
19,25
Some people manage, in between acute episodes, to keep a sense of their past self and continuing identity, ostensibly by drawing a distinction between themselves and their condition. Lally describes those who "separated themselves from their condition," as a way of maintaining "some sense of competence" and preserving "some of the self as uncontaminated," and also "how some patients manage to prevent their illness from becoming the primary definition of themselves." 22 A patient reflects retrospectively on their first episode of schizophrenia:
"rational thinking was not right-there was my own personality and another one." 23 Strauss, a clinician, discusses the importance of gaining an understanding of the patient, distinct from their condition, and says, for example, "a broad perspective on patients' subjective reports appears to reflect the person as an active agent interacting with a disorder." 24 There's been a radical shift in my social interactions, family relations, and cognitive abilities 26 and Glover comments on how, even during "periods of relative stability," there may be a "transformation," which can "last a lifetime, either uninterrupted or alternating with acute episodes." Romme describes the process of domination by psychosis and withdrawal from past behaviours:
For some years, one of my patients, a 30-year-old woman, has heard voices in her mind. These voices give her orders or forbid her to do things. They dominate her completely … the voices have isolated her more and more by forbidding her to do things she has always loved to do.
27
These identity changes brought about by psychosis also separate the individual from those around them, through exposure to formative experiences that cannot be shared by others: "psychosis 'breaches' the intersubjective reality of others. Others cannot share the patient's subjective reality nor can the patient share others' reality." 22 Although such changes are generally viewed as deleterious and psychotic experiences are very often a cause of fear and distress to those who encounter them, it is, nevertheless, important to acknowledge that a positive view of such phenomena may also be an important part of the psychotic individual's subjective experience. Janice admits that, no matter how deeply the agency's plot torments her, what she fears, more than anything, would be to find out that the plot had, in fact, been unreal. Psychotic phenomena may be seen as bringing advantages or conferring some special status or experience. Benjamin, for example, quotes a patient describing how, occasionally, his "voice,"
despite its frequent critical comments, can be benevolent and set them aside from others:
It tells me I'm okay if I'm really, really down. Then it's almost like it's someone there, a friend. So it's okay.
That knows me better than anything else. It's a comfort.
Even though it is mean, if it wasn't there, I'd be like everybody else and lose myself.
She provides other examples of how "a hallucination can be valued as an important companion and is cherished as well as dreaded by schizophrenic persons." If this were the case, how is it possible to make sense of those who view themselves or others as having a persistent identity, despite all the changes-in Jepson's words: "I am and will always be ME." 4 Amelia, Janice, and Johann may have changed in unrecognisable ways, and yet they still identify themselves as the same person, despite such changes, a view that is echoed in numerous first-person accounts of schizophrenia.
Even for those who draw some distinction between their psychotic and prepsychotic or nonpsychotic self, there are still difficulties with the reductionist model. They will retain the memory of and be affected by the experiences of both their condition and its treatment, which occurred while unwell. As well as this, the lack of a notion of some continuing identity throughout these periods leads to more diffi-
culties. An anonymous service user states that the last stage in recovery from schizophrenia was "a restoration to the person I once was in my late teens, when I was accomplished in various domains." 28 The self has a temporal dimension and life course in a society and culture, and it is subject to introspective monitoring that is contemporaneous, retrospective, and prospective. Schizophrenia is seen here as impairing this self-monitoring capacity and the individual's life trajectory.
9
If our sense of self is constituted by how we relate to and are perceived by those around us, it seems that a condition that causes a massive fracture in that relationship will cause irreparable damage to the self. With Johann, for example, to those closest to him, it seems that schizophrenia has imposed a major and irreversible change of self.
Stanghellini and Ballerini name the "refusal of interpersonal bonds" as a prevalent feature within schizophrenia. Alongside feelings of detachment and disconnection, comes the "refusal of intimate interpersonal connections" and they suggest that such connections might even be perceived as a threat to identity: "The contact with other human beings may be felt as a dangerous source of loss of identity." 8 As explained above, psychosis affects the capacity for intersubjectivity. For identity to survive psychosis, it appears that it must also be able to admit an element of selfhood that is not dependent upon its interpersonal dimension.
It therefore seems that each of these existing models of continuing identity are a poor fit for the transitions associated with psychotic disorders, given that, within all of them, persistence depends upon a component of selfhood that is substantially compromised by psychosis. How, then, can we explain identity within psychotic disorders?
3.2 | Psychosis and continuing identity-towards an alternative model
One way of constructing a notion of identity compatible with psychosis might be to see identity as an inversion of existing models of selfhood. Let us first consider the relational model of selfhood, which sees identity as constituted by our role within culture and society, our shared experiences, and how we are known to the others around us. As we have said, psychosis, with its experience of an alternative reality, perceptible only to the psychotic individual, isolates the individual from a common reality with those around them and of which they themselves were part prior to illness; "All the things the voices told me, I believed. All the things I saw, I believed. I didn't make contact with the world of my friends nor with that of the passersby." 31 Some propose a phenomenon of schizophrenic "antagonomia,"
in which "persons with schizophrenia exhibit a general distrust toward emotional attunement with other people and are sceptical toward conventional knowledge and socially shared values and express an explicit repugnance to common ways of thinking." 8 Psychosis, therefore, raises the possibility that, just as the self can be defined in terms of its interrelationship with others, on another level, it can be defined in terms of its essential separateness. Essential to psychotic identity is some degree of participation in a belief system and experiential world, which is not shared by others.
Furthermore, essential to this separateness is the fact that this experiential world is not only not shared by others, but is, to others, unreal and therefore, fundamentally, illegitimate. We might define the psychotic self as not only simply separate but also essentially agonistic, insofar as it immerses the individual in a version of reality, which is opposed to that held by those around them and makes this element and see themselves as having a legitimate identity can, he seems to suggest, be a useful step in helping them to manage the negative effects of their condition. Likewise, Romme and Escher discuss the positive effects that can come from interaction with, rather than resistance to, psychotic voices, 27 while such strategies are used in the application of ACT (Acceptance and Commitment Therapy) to psychosis. 37 Along with an inversion of the relational model, we would like to propose that an inversion of both the psychological reductionist and narrative identity concepts might be helpful when conceptualising identity within psychotic disorders. As we have seen, the onset of psychosis brings about a fundamental transition in elements of personality, values, and beliefs whose continuity, for the reductionist, is central to the persistence of identity. A notion of selfhood within psychosis will therefore depend upon being able to integrate fundamental discontinuity, whether this be persistent or episodic. Similarly, for narrativists, stable identity depends upon overall coherence over time.
Yet psychosis is essentially incoherent with the individual's nonpsychotic self. In more simple terms, to create a concept of selfhood that will not consign those with psychosis to loss of meaningful identity, this concept needs to be able to incorporate the fundamental discontinuity of behaviour and beliefs, as well as the deep incongruity of different stages of the individual's life and experiences. While reductionists and narrativists might hold continuity and coherence to be central to continuing identity, it appears that, conversely, a model of selfhood over time that can accommodate psychosis must incorporate fundamental discontinuity and incoherence.
| CONCLUSION
In 1989, in a special edition of Schizophrenia Bulletin dedicated to questions of selfhood and identity, Estroff suggested that viewing the person with schizophrenia as irreversibly different and incomprehensible may contribute to the negative outcomes of the condition.
1 ‡ Nevertheless, it still seems to be the case that the feelings of isolation and illegitimacy experienced by those with psychotic disorders may be exacerbated by a failure, on our part, to recognize and gain further understanding of how a sense of continuing identity forms an important element of their lived experience and self-concept. This creates the considerable challenge of finding some way to accommodate persistence and stability alongside the major changes involved in such disorders. To answer such a challenge, we may well need to look beyond existing philosophical models of personal identity and our conventional ways of thinking about the persistence of identity. For the notions of coherence, connectedness and continuity at the heart of these ideas appear to leave little room to judge the changes brought by psychotic illness as anything but loss or diminution of selfhood.
Although it may seem paradoxical when judged in terms of such ideas, finding a valid notion of legitimate and continuing identity for the individual with psychosis might actually depend upon seeing separateness, discontinuity, incongruity, and their invalidity to others as essential to their sense of self.
